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Two Constructivist Aspects of Category
Theory
Colin McLarty
Case Western Reserve University (USA)
Abstract: Category theory has two unexpected links to constructivism: First,
why is topos logic so close to intuitionistic logic? The paper argues that in
part the resemblance is superficial, in part it is due to selective attention, and
in part topos theory is objectively tied to the motives for later intuitionistic
logic little related to Brouwer’s own stated motives. Second, why is so much of
general category theory somehow constructive? The paper aims to synthesize
three hypotheses on why it would be so, with three that suggest it is not.
Philosophia Scientiæ, Cahier spécial 6, 2006, 95–114.
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The founders of category theory were not sympathetic to construc-
tivism or to the idea that there can be a systematically constructive
mathematics. Yet category theory has two unexpected links to construc-
tivism which deserve to be posed as questions rather than stated as facts.
Why is topos logic so close to intuitionistic logic? And why is so much
general category theory somehow constructive?
The ﬁrst is formally unproblematic. It is a fact of model theory that in
many toposes the axiom of choice is false, the law of excluded middle fails,
and the double negation of a sentence does not imply that sentence. The
serious question, though, is more conceptual: Why should toposes agree
so closely with the logic Brouwer and Heyting created? We weigh several
answers which each have some share of the truth: The resemblance is
superﬁcial. Or, it is rigged by selective attention. Or, topos theory is
objectively tied to the motives for later intuitionistic logic, though not to
Brouwer’s stated motives. At any rate topos theory has been a productive
source of formal models for many aspects of intuitionistic foundations.
Without assuming any precise sense of constructive mathematics, we
can discuss the relation of category theory to logical themes associated
with constructivism: avoiding excluded middle, requiring speciﬁed in-
stances for existence claims, avoiding the axiom of choice etc. Obviously
there are versions of category theory that meet these restrictions. The
question is, why does so much category theory naturally meet them?
Very often, once a category theoretic problem is laid out, just one con-
struction from the data is even a candidate solution and in fact it is the
solution. We consider six hypotheses:
1. Category theory is so general that nothing weaker than explicit
constructions can work across the whole range of it.
2. Category theory conceals non-constructivity in its basic terms.
3. Category theory is too young yet to need nonconstructive proofs.
4. Category theory looks constructive because so much of it has been
created for computer science.
5. Category theory gives such direct access to structure that it natu-
rally ﬁnds explicit solutions to its problems.
6. The category axioms have such a weak logical form that there is
little occasion for non-constructive methods.
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Hypotheses 1, 5, and 6 oﬀer reasons why category theory would be some-
how constructive. Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 urge that it is not really so.
We attempt a synthesis.
The category axioms are few enough to give in full. A category has
objects A,B,C. . . , and arrows f :A→B between them. For example the
category of sets, called Set, has sets as objects and functions f :A→B as
arrows. In any categoryC, when arrows f and g have matching codomain
and domain, as shown, they have a composite gf :
B
g
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A
f
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// C
Each object A has an identity morphism 1A :A→A deﬁned as having
f1A = f and 1Bf = f for every f :A→B. The last axiom is associativity,
saying (hg)f = h(gf) for any h :C→D. Clearly these hold for functions
between sets, with 1A the usual identity function on A, and gf the
composite deﬁned by (gf)(x) = g(f(x)). Other categories have quite
other objects and arrows, see [Mac Lane 1986, chap. XI] or [McLarty
1998].
1 Category Theory as somehow
Constructive
The 1969 Summer Institute on category theory at Bowdoin College pro-
duced a “ﬁnal exam” with the stern instructions “this is a take-home
exam: do not bring it back!” and these two among its questions:
4. (Mac Lane’s Theorem) Prove that every diagram commu-
tes.
14. Write down the evident diagram, apply the obvious ar-
gument, and obtain the usual result. [Phreilambud 1970]
Question 4 is like saying every equation in calculus is true—except that
in calculus it would just be a grim mistake. From introductory calculus
through research in analysis one often ﬁnds attractive equations which
are, sadly, not true. It makes a joke in category theory because of the
common experience that every diagram one is tempted to write down
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does commute.1 Question 14 takes it farther. Many theorems in category
theory are proven by explicit, and evident, diagrams.
A simple case is typical. A terminal object in a category C is deﬁned
as an object 1 such that for each object A of C there is one and only one
arrow from A to 1. In the category Set the terminal objects are precisely
the singleton sets S = {s}. The product of two objects A and B in C is
deﬁned as an object A×B plus two projection arrows, say π1 :A×B→A
and π2 :A×B → B with the natural property of projections from a
product. That is, for any object C and arrows f :C→A and g :C→B in
C, one and only one arrow u :C→A×B makes this diagram commute,
or in other words π1u = f and π2u = g:
C
u

f
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// B
Theorem 1 (In any category C that has a terminal object 1.) For every
object A there are projection arrows π1 :A→1 and π2 :A→A so that A
is its own product with 1. That is 1×A=A.
The pattern of the proof recurs throughout category theory:
• We need an arrow π1 :A→1 with a certain property. But by deﬁ-
nition of 1, there is only one arrow A→1 so it must be π1.
• We need an arrow π2 :A→A with a certain property. There may
be many diﬀerent arrows A→A (as for example a set generally has
many functions to itself). But, given no special information about
A, only the identity arrow 1A stands out. So try π2 = 1A.
• For any object B and arrows f :B→1 and g :B→A in C we need
a unique arrow u making the diagram commute:
B
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// A
No arrow B→ A stands out per se, but exactly one is named in
the data. That is g, so try u = g.
1It also refers to Mac Lane’s coherence theorems which say that every plausible
diagram in a certain situation commutes [Mac Lane 1998, 165].
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These choices work. On the left, π1u = f since there is only one arrow
B→1. On the right, 1Ag = g by deﬁnition of 1A. The proof is done.
More signiﬁcant proofs often use the same pattern. We need an ar-
row with such-and-so domain, and such-and-so codomain, and a certain
property. The data oﬀer just one straightforward construction of an ar-
row with that domain and codomain. And indeed that arrow has the
property.2 These proofs are constructive in the sense that they use no
argument by contradiction, nor excluded middle, nor choice. The answer
is explicitly constructed from the data of the problem.
1.1 The Six Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 oﬀers to explain this pervasive fact by a variant of the idea
that constructive proof proves more. It supposes that only constructive
proofs prove enough:
Hypothesis 1 Category theory is so general that nothing weaker than
explicit constructions can work across the whole range of it.
Theorem 1 looks like it deals with singleton sets and cartesian pro-
ducts. Interpreted in the category Set it deals with exactly those. In
many familiar categories it deals with things like those. But “like” is a
broad term. Take the category Setop, called the dual to the category
of sets. The objects are sets, and an arrow fop :A→ B in Setop is a
function in the opposite direction f :B→A. The superscript “op” merely
shows we take fop as an arrow of Setop, reversed from its direction as a
function. Composition is deﬁned in the natural way:
B
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fopgop=(gf)op
// A
Composing in Set Composing in Setop
The empty set ∅ is terminal in Setop, which is the same as saying it is
initial in Set. Every set A has a unique Setop arrow uop :A→∅ because
it has a unique function u : ∅→A, namely the empty function. Similar
arrow switching shows that for any sets A,B the disjoint union A + B
is a product in Setop. Reverse the inclusion function i1 :A→A + B to
make a projection iop1 :A+B→A in Set
op.
2For those who know the terminology: The canonical version uses adjoints. We
have an adjunction F ⊣ G and need an arrow FA→B with a certain property. The
data offer just one g :A→GB and its adjunct has the property.
100 Colin McLarty
Theorem 1 applied in Setop says every set A is its own disjoint union
A + ∅ with the empty set. Other categories give other interpretations.
A formal logical theory can be construed as a category with formulas
as objects and implications as arrows. In such a category (resp. its du-
al) the theorem says every formula is equivalent to it conjunction with
True (resp. its disjunction with False), see e.g. [Johnstone 2002, vol.
2, D1]. More arcane “products,” widely used in algebra, number theory,
geometry or other ﬁelds, appear as categorical products in suitable ca-
tegories and so Theorem 1 applies to them. Hypothesis 1 suggests that
only constructive proofs are strong enough to be valid across all of this
range—or at it least it is so to a good approximation.
Hypothesis 2 Category theory conceals non-constructivity in its basic
terms.
The argument so far has been that much category theory uses construc-
tive logic: no excluded middle, no double negation or reductio proof.
But what about the basic steps, such as composing arrows? Worse, a
basic step in many proofs is to take a limit or colimit over some inﬁnite
diagram (e.g. the Freyd adjoint functor theorems [Mac Lane 1998, 127].
Even these proofs are relatively constructive since the theorem explicit-
ly assumes these limits or colimits exist. But there is no constructive
proof that they do exist in the desired applications, e.g. to the category
of groups or of topological spaces. When so many theorems use such
assumptions, can the theory really be called constructive?
Traditional constructivisms have epistemological motives. They take
basic constructions of natural numbers as intuitively clear: selecting 0,
and passing from a given n to n+1. Most constructivists can evaluate any
speciﬁed primitive recursive function at any given argument—because
the evaluation reduces by (what most constructivists regard as) explicit
steps to those basic constructions. Theorem 1 was proved by explicit
basic steps: given A select its unique arrow to 1, and its identity arrow
1A; given composable arrows form their composite. But these are not
like selecting 0 or passing from n to n+1. In axiomatic category theory
neither the datum A nor its identity arrow 1A can be speciﬁed at all.
And speciﬁc examples generally are not speciﬁed constructively in any
traditional sense.
Even the simplest step, ﬁnding the identity arrow of an object A,
need not be constructive even when A itself is constructively given and
each arrow is eﬀective. For example, assume some eﬀective coding of the
partial recursive functions ϕn by natural numbers n. Form a category
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whose objects are recursive subsets of the natural numbers, and arrows
are natural numbers. Speciﬁcally, n :S→S′ is an arrow if
• ϕn(x) ∈ S′ for every x ∈ S.
• ϕn(x) is undeﬁned when x /∈ S.
• n is the smallest natural number which codes the function ϕn.
Coding any recursive speciﬁcation of S amounts to coding the identity
function restricted to S. But there is no eﬀective way to ﬁnd the smallest
code for it. So there is no eﬀective way to ﬁnd the identity arrow on S.
For the same reason, composition is not eﬀective in this category.
In short, much general category theory is relatively constructive. It
proceeds explicitly by basic categorical steps. But the steps are not “con-
structive” in any epistemological sense.
Hypothesis 3 Category theory is too young yet to need nonconstruc-
tive proofs.
Hypothesis 4 Category theory looks constructive because so much of
it has been created for computer science.
These make a pair since hypothesis 3 was more plausible up to, say,
the 1970s, when hypothesis 4 supplanted it. By the 1970s the Grothen-
dieck school had produced huge amounts of category theory applied in
topology and algebraic geometry. Others, notably around Mac Lane and
Lawvere, had extended the theory in many directions including logic and
foundations of mathematics. The subject had grown enough to leave hy-
pothesis 3 behind.
Much of the growth has been in computer science, and especially
applications to computable data type speciﬁcation. See e.g. [Jacobs 2001]
[Adámek, Escardó & Hofmann 2003]. Probably, though, this is better
seen as following a natural tendency in category theory than as forcing
the subject into a computable framework. And of course the theory of
computing is not itself all computable.
Hypothesis 5 Category theory gives such direct access to structure
that it naturally ﬁnds explicit solutions to its problems.
Hypothesis 6 The category axioms have such a weak logical form that
there is little occasion for non-constructive methods.
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These two make a natural pair if “direct” access means access not media-
ted by powerful logical tools. Textbooks use category theory as a conve-
nient, light, general framework for organizing many particular kinds of
structure [Lang 1965]. Hypothesis 5 suggests this works by foregrounding
the explicit, constructive aspects of each particular structure. Hypothe-
sis 6 suggests the key to this is the logical form of the basic category
axioms. The various versions of constructive mathematics diﬀer from
classical over the use of negation, disjunction, existential quantiﬁcation,
and the axiom of choice. None of these occurs in the category axioms.
Only the existential quantiﬁer needs any discussion.
There is no genuine existential quantiﬁer in the axiom saying arrows
have domains and codomains, because every arrow has a unique do-
main and codomain. The axiom can use a domain operator Dom and a
codomain operator Cod so the formula
Dom(f) = A & Cod(f) = B
says A is the domain of f and B the codomain. Composition too can
be expressed by an operator, written as mere juxtaposition gf . The
composite is unique when it exists. Composition is a partial operator.
The key point is that gf exists if and only if an equation is satisﬁed:
Cod(f) = Dom(g)
The category axioms form an essentially algebraic theory [Freyd 1972].3
They can be stated by equations using a partially deﬁned operator (com-
position), with its domain of deﬁnition given by equations in preceding
operators (the domain and codomain operators). They also use an iden-
tity arrow operator 1_ taking an object A to its identity 1A. It is con-
venient to present them as sequents with no connectives:
⊢ Dom(gf) = Dom(f) ⊢ Cod(gf) = Cod(g)
⊢ Dom(1A) = A ⊢ Cod(1A) = A
⊢ f1A = f ⊢ 1Bf = f
⊢ (hg)f = h(gf)
A sequent may have a list of equations on the left hand side, and is
read as saying they entail the equation on the right. The axioms need
no equations on the left.
The only complication is that a sequent including a composite τ2τ1
implicitly assumes Cod(τ1) = Dom(τ2). So, when a cut eliminates a
3Compare [McLarty 1986], [Johnstone 2002, D.1.3].
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term τ2τ1 from a sequent, then Cod(τ1) = Dom(τ2) must be added to
the left hand side of the resulting sequent. The assumption which had
been implicit must be made explicit. It can be cut later if in fact it
follows from other explicit assumptions.4
Then the only rules of inference are the equality rules, the modi-
ﬁed cut rule and term substitution. These are all explicit constructions.
The same weak logic suﬃces for many extension of the category axioms:
categories with all ﬁnite products, or with all ﬁnite colimits, or cartesi-
an closed categories, and much more. See the references. Each of these
naturally uses explicit constructions.
This logic is too weak for any foundation for mathematics. Its theories
always admit trivial models, so that any candidate foundation must have
axioms not in this form. For example the central axiom for categorical
set theory says a function is determined by its value on elements. In
full: for any two diﬀerent parallel functions, f, g :A→ B with f 6= g,
there is some x : 1 → A with f(x) 6= g(x). This uses negation. And
even so it does not preclude models trivial in the sense that all sets
are isomorphic, simultaneously initial (intuitively, empty) and terminal
(intuitively, singleton), and for any two sets A,B there is exactly one
function A→ B. One convenient non-triviality axiom names an initial
set ∅, and a terminal set 1, and says, with the universality interpretation
of the free variable f :
⊢ ¬[Dom(f) = 1 & Cod(f) = 0]
No arrow goes 1→ 0. Then any theorem which requires non-triviality
will include some reductio step in its proof, going back to one of these
negations in the axioms.
In short, unlike the basic category axioms, the usual categorical foun-
dations cannot be given in a logic of explicit constructions. They can be
construed “constructively” of course. But that will make a real diﬀerence
from the ordinary classical construal.
It remains, though, that much of category theory at every level natu-
rally rests on construction. The hypotheses cooperate in explaining this.
To say the axioms are weak is to say they are general. In this sense hypo-
thesis 6 subsumes hypothesis 1 saying category theory is so general that
it must be largely constructive. Hypotheses 1 and 5 combine to say it is a
natural generality, not just generality in principle. All three happily join
hypothesis 2—except that instead of “concealing” stronger logical prin-
ciples, category theory locates them where they belong. They are in the
4This is a notational variant of the presentation in [McLarty 1986].
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speciﬁcs but not in the general framework of each mathematical subject.
Hypothesis 3 found category too young to need many nonconstructive
proofs, which has been historically implausible for some decades. Better
to say that category theory in its organizational role is meant to bring
out the simplest aspects of each subject. It is not too young but rather too
focussed on explication to rely heavily on non-constructive proof. From
this viewpoint hypothesis 4 loses its explanatory role. Category theory
is not explained by its use in computer science. But the viewpoint makes
it natural that category theory would be used that way since computer
science is all about organization and explicit description.
2 Topos Logic as “Intuitionistic”
A topos is any category E that shares certain key properties with Set,
the category of all sets. In a nutshell: A topos E has a “singleton” 1, in
other words a terminal object. It has a product A×B for any two objects
A,B. And each object A has a power object PA, which is the power set
of A in the case of E=Set.5
So there is a standard interpretation of multi-sorted higher order logic
in any topos E. Given a multi-sorted higher order language L, interpret
each sort σ by an object Aσ. An operator φ(x1, . . . , xn), with sort σi for
each argument xi and sort τ as value, is interpreted as an arrow from
the product sort
Aσ1 × · · · ×Aσn // Aτ
The power sort Pσ of any sort σ is interpreted by the power object PAσ
of the object Aσ. This implies that predicates P (x) on terms x of sort σ
correspond to subobjects
S //
iP // Aσ
Here a subobject is any monic arrow to A.6
5Detailed treatments of topos theory and logic are in [Bell 1988][Johnstone
2002][Mac Lane & Moerdijk 1992][McLarty 1991] among many other sources.
6Predicate symbols may be taken as such, or reconstrued as operator symbols with
values in a truth-value sort Ω. Subobjects may be construed as monic arrows (treated
up to equivalence) or as equivalence classes of monic arrows, or as arrows to a truth
value object Ω. No matter which formal definitions are chosen, the interpretants of
predicates correspond to subobjects.
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The topos axioms imply there is an empty, or initial, object ∅. They
imply that any two subobjects i, j of an object A have an intersection:
S ∩ T


// // T

j

S //
i
// A
Namely, S ∩ T is the largest subobject of A contained in both S and T .
Any subobject i :S֌A has a negation, namely the largest subobject of
A disjoint from it:
S ∩ ¬S = ∅


// // ¬S

¬i

S //
i
// A
The axioms imply that any two subobjects i, j of an object A have a
union deﬁned as the smallest subobject containing both:
S // //
""
i
""E
EE
EE
EE
E
S ∪ T


Toooo
||
j
||xx
xx
xx
xx
A
These deﬁnitions typify topos logic: The intersection of two subob-
jects has to be smaller than each, and clearly has to be the largest subob-
ject smaller than each. Given that the negation of S should be disjoint
from S, surely it must be the largest subobject disjoint from S. The
union of two subobjects has to include both, and clearly must be the
smallest subobject to include both.
Here is an element of intuitionism in topos logic. These deﬁnitions
imply only some of the classical laws. The deﬁnition says S and ¬S are
disjoint. But ¬¬S is the largest subobject disjoint from ¬S, so it is larger
than S:
S ⊆ ¬¬S
The opposite inclusion does not always hold in topos models, and neither
does the law of excluded middle. For example, let E = ShR be the topos
of sheaves on the real line R. The subobjects of 1 (in other words the
truth values in E) are open subsets of R. Think of a truth value as
measuring the extent to which a claim is true as it varies over the line.
A claim is True if its measure is the whole real line and it is False if its
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measure is the empty set. In other words the maximal subset R֌R of
the line is the truth value True, and the minimal subset ∅֌ R is the
truth value False. There are inﬁnitely many intermediate truth values.
Intersection and union of these subobjects in ShR have their mea-
nings naively lifted from Set because the set theoretic intersection or
union of open subsets is always open. In contrast the negation of an
open subset is the largest open subset disjoint from it and this is general-
ly smaller than the set theoretic complement. Take U = {x ∈ R | 0 6= x}.
Its set theoretic complement is the singleton {0} and not open, so not a
subobject of 1. The only open subset disjoint from U is the empty set ∅.
So ¬U = ∅. But every subset is disjoint from ∅ so
¬¬U = ¬∅ = R * U
The double negation of U is True although U is not. And the union of
U with its negation is not True:
U ∪ ¬U = U ∪ ∅ = U 6= R
In terms of logic, sentences of the form
¬¬φ⇒ φ and φ ∨ ¬φ
are not always true in topos models.
The axiom of choice fails in most toposes. A convenient form of the
axiom says: Every onto function f :A→B has a right inverse g :B→A.
More fully: if for each y ∈ B there exists an x ∈ A such that f(x) = y
then some function g selects for each y ∈ B a value such that f(g(y)) = y.
Classical mathematicians accept this as true for sets. But in the topos
E = ShT of sheaves on a topological space T all functions are continuous
and this same axiom says: If a continuous function f :A→B is onto, then
it has a continuous right inverse g :B → A. Classical mathematicians
know this is generally false. The cubic polynomial
R
x3−x
// R
is continuous and onto. It has inﬁnitely many right inverses—but none
are continuous.7 A classical mathematician pursuing model theory in
toposes will ﬁnd the axiom of choice fails in this case in this topos.
7I.e, for every y0 ∈ R there is at least one solution in x to x3 − x = y0. Indeed
there is at least one way to choose solutions to x3 − x = y continuously for all y in
some interval around y0. For a small interval around y0 = 0 there are three ways.
But there is no way to choose them continuously for all y ∈ R.
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So far this is like intuitionistic logic. But a central idea of intuitio-
nism fails in many toposes. An existential statement ∃xφ(x) can be true
in a topos when there is no instance verifying φ(x). That is, when it is
“everywhere true that there is an instance” yet no instance works every-
where. Roughly, in the topological case of a topos E = ShT of sheaves
on a topological space T , the measure of truth of an existential state-
ment ∃xφ(x) is the union of all the open subsets U ⊆ T such that some
instance deﬁned over U makes φ(x) true. It can happen that T is covered
by such subsets yet no one instance exists over all of T . Then ∃xφ(x) is
true over all of T but no instance of it is.
Further, as in the case of general category theory, topos logic does
not require its predicates and operations to be any kind of intuitionistic.
Arithmetic in a topos uses induction on every formula ψ(x) with x a
variable over the natural numbers. Given x a variable over an object A,
every formula φ(x) with x as the sole free variable deﬁnes a subobject of
A. Topos logic includes none of the intuitionistic restrictions on induction
or comprehension found, for example, in [Troelstra 1973].
The subject synthetic differential geometry (SDG) posits an ordered
continuum R like the real number line R but with this property quite
unlike R: For any function f :R → R and any point x0 ∈ R there is
a unique linear function ax + b which agrees with f on an inﬁnitesi-
mal neighborhood of x0. In other words, every function f :R→ R has
a uniquely deﬁned derivative at each point. This theory is classically
inconsistent but it has topos models, see [Bell 1998]. In these models a
function f :R→R need not be intuitionistically speciﬁable, nor is there
any constructive or intuitionistic procedure for ﬁnding the derivative of
f at a given point. In these models of SDG the classical laws of excluded
middle and double negation fail. So does the axiom of choice. But the
axioms of the theory make no intuitionistic sense.8
Some toposes are closer than others to classical intuitionism. In some
an existential statement ∃xφ(x) is true only when some instance of it
is. In other toposes this principle fails in general but holds for some
interesting class of predicates φ(x). Topos models are useful in exploring
the foundations of Brouwer’s intuitionistic analysis, notably continuity
principles and choice sequences [Fourman 1979][van der Hoeven, Gerrit
& Moerdijk 1984]. Topos logic per se is far from Brouwerian.
The resemblance of topos logic to intuitionism is superﬁcial from
Brouwer’s viewpoint. Brouwer would construct mathematics from “the
basic intuition of two-ity” [Brouwer 1911, 122]. Topos logic has none
8It is a different point, though also correct, that the models are not intuitionistic.
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of that. From the viewpoint of formal model theory, exploring aspects
of Brouwer’s mathematics without accepting his epistemology, there is
similarity in just some respects. Yet the question remains: Why is topos
logic even this close to Heyting’s formalization of Brouwer’s ideas, while
sharing so little of the stated motivation?
The examples above suggest a natural idea. Brouwer was a topologist
and many toposes are “topological.”, i.e. toposes E = ShT of sheaves on
any topological space T . Excluded middle, and double negation, and the
axiom of choice fail in such toposes. They fail basically because they are
not stable under continuous variation. A “truth value” in such a topos is
an open set U ⊆ T , so any point p in U is surrounded by some little region
lying entirely in U . Perhaps Brouwer favored claims that are stable in this
way? For example, perhaps he did not want to aﬃrm “every real number
is either equal to 0 or not” because 0 has non-zero reals arbitrarily close
to it? This explanation is doubly inadequate, though, as there is little
trace of it in Brouwer’s own topology and topology is not the only source
of topos logic.9
Brouwer in no way avoids classical logic in his topology and even
gratuitously uses contradiction in the proof central to his method.10 He
produces four integers we can call a1, a2, a3, a4 and he needs to prove
a1 = a4. He ﬁrst proves
a1 = a2 and a2 = a3 and a3 = a4
He then supposes a1 6= a4, reasons from this back to a1 6= a2, and from
the contradiction concludes a1 = a4 [Brouwer 1911, 432]. He frequently
assumes every point in Rn lies either on or not on any given (n − 1)-
dimensional plane. As a special case: every real number is either 0 or not
0. His later intuitionism would actually support argument by contradic-
tion for equality of integers, and reject it for the reals. But in 1911 he
used both with no hint at any such distinction.
His great topological papers follow the line of his dissertation: Exclu-
ded middle and proof by contradiction are as harmless as modus ponens,
but attention to their use is harmful:
the proposition “A function is either diﬀerentiable or not dif-
ferentiable” says nothing; it expresses the same as the follo-
9Indeed the original source was Grothendieck topologies in algebraic geometry.
These are not topological spaces in the usual sense at all [Mac Lane & Moerdijk
1992].
10I.e. a lemma using homotopy to show mapping degree is constant on non-singular
points of certain maps Rn→Rn.
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wing: “If a function is not diﬀerentiable then it is not diﬀe-
rentiable.”
But the logician, looking at the words of the former sentence,
and discovering a regularity in the combination of words in
this and similar sentences, here again projects a mathemati-
cal system, and he calls such a sentence an application of the
tertium non datur [excluded middle]. . . .
It is self-evident that in the language that accompanies ma-
thematics, the succession of words obeys certain laws, but to
consider these laws as directing the building up of mathema-
tics, it is there that the error lies.11
So Brouwer’s speciﬁc work in topology does not seem closely tied in his
own mind to his later critique of logic.
Furthermore the resemblance between intuitionist and topos logic is
not restricted to the topological case. It is common to all toposes. That
means all elementary toposes, all models of the Lawvere-Tierney topos
axioms, and not only the Grothendieck toposes. Heyting’s intuitionistic
predicate logic is sound and complete for models in all elementary topo-
ses [Bell 1988]. Of course it is incomplete when the models are conﬁned
to certain toposes, notably when they are required to be in the topos
Set or in other words are required to be standard Tarski type models.
Actually closer to Brouwer’s intuitionistic analysis are realizability
toposes.12 Introduced around 1980, they are based on an idea already
linked to Brouwer by [Kleene 1945]. In the usual realizability toposes an
existential sentence ∃xφ(x) is true if and only if some instance of it is. But
for a universal, say ∀xφ(x), it is not enough that each speciﬁc value x0
have φ(x0) true. There needs to be some suitably computable procedure
taking each value x0 and ﬁnding a realizer for φ(x0). The motivation is
that a realizer for a sentence codes a proof of that sentence. In particular
a quantiﬁed disjunction
∀x[φ(x) ∨ ¬φ(x)]
is true in such a topos only if there is a suitably computable procedure
taking each value x0 and either ﬁnding that φ(x0) is true or else ﬁnding
that ¬φ(x0) is true. There must be a decision routine.
11[Brouwer 1907, 75, 90], Brouwer’s emphasis. Compare contradiction and the syl-
logism on pages 73–74.
12These are not Grothendieck. See [Hyland 1982][McLarty 2001][van Oosten 2004].
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To explain why topos logic is this close to intuitionistic logic we must
begin by distinguishing formalized intuitionistic logic from Brouwer’s
philosophy. The more familiar issue is the axiom of choice. The most
telling for us will be in Heyting’s intuitionistic sentential logic.
Brouwer did not criticize the axiom of choice so much as the classical
applications of it. For an intuitionist, given a function f :A→B, the only
way to know that for each y ∈ B there exists an x ∈ A with f(x) = y, is
to know some construction which takes an arbitrary y ∈ B to such an x.
I.e. the only way to know f is onto is to know a right inverse g to it. The
axiom of choice from this point of view is a pure tautology, of no use,
since the consequent merely repeats the antecedent. Yet formal systems
of “intuitionistic set theory” generally reject it. The issue is well laid out
in [DeVidi 2004].
As to sentential logic, Heyting’s intuitionistic version includes as true
φ⇒ (¬φ⇒ ψ)
This is nonsense in Brouwer’s philosophy because it reasons from expli-
citly absurd premises: if you know φ then if you also know ¬φ then. . . .
Kolmogorov excluded it from his formalization of Brouwerian logic for
just this reason [Kolmogorov 1967]. Later Heyting included it with some
discomfort. This issue is described in detail in [Haack 1996, 102].
In each case topos logic agrees with the usual formalized versions
against Brouwer’s philosophical tendency—for example with Heyting in
sentential logic rather than Kolmogorov, though Kolmogorov is closer to
Brouwer. The best explanation is Lawvere’s view of a topos as a universe
of variable sets [Lawvere 1975][Lawvere 1976]. Lawvere points out that
Heyting’s intuitionistic predicate logic has a clear explanation as the
objective logic of the simplest kind of variation, namely Kripke models
where sets vary over a partially ordered set of stages. For example, for a
negation ¬φ to be true at a stage p it is not enough that φ is not true
at p—it requires that φ is not true at any stage q later than p.13 Each
model in Kripke’s sense gives a topos model. This has a clear analogy to
Brouwer’s idea of knowledge developing over time—but Brouwer’s idea
raises ambiguities as above. The objective idea of presheaf on a partial
order raises none. The inﬂuential versions of formal intuitionistic logic
have repeatedly followed the objective idea.
The truth conditions of statements in a topos vary progressively along
the stages of a Kripke model, or continuously over a topological space,
13Kolmogorov’s logic has a more complicated semantics where ¬φ only requires
that φ is not true at certain later stages [Segerberg 1968].
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or computably over a domain of realizers, or in other ways. Excluded
middle φ ∨ ¬φ fails in a given topos when the variation from φ to ¬φ is
not neatly split over stages, or separated over the space, or computable
by the realizers, or otherwise suitable in the other cases. The axiom of
choice fails when the instances to be chosen do exist but do not vary
progressively or continuously or computably. . . . Other classical princip-
les fail in general for analogous reasons. Of course they do all hold in
some cases, notably the topos Set. As Lawvere puts it, Set is the limi-
ting case of constancy, or in other words null variation, so that it poses
no obstacle to excluded middle or choice or other classical principles.
To be precise, Heyting’s ﬁrst order predicate logic is sound for all
toposes: When premises entail a conclusion in this logic and the premises
are true in some topos modelM, then the conclusion is true in M. This
logic is also complete for topos models: Any set of sentences Γ which
entails no contradiction in this logic has a topos model. Indeed the logic
is already complete for Kripke models.
We have only looked at a few special kinds of topos. The far more
general kinds of variation found in toposes do not extend the range of
ﬁrst order models. They radically extend the range of higher order mo-
dels, including models of analysis. But there is no standard higher order
intuitionistic logic. See the many variants in [Troelstra 1973]. There is no
point in asking for a precise comparison of topos logic with “intuitionistic
logic” at this level.
Brouwer in 1907 found it harmful to focus on logic. By 1908 he ac-
cused science of “the fundamental sin of apprehension or desire” com-
pounded by an “irreligious separation” of means and ends, so that “li-
ke any irreligious consciousness, science has neither religious reliabili-
ty nor reliability in itself. . . [and so] logical deductions are unreliable in
science” [Brouwer 1908, 107]. These motives could not lead to any speciﬁc
logic in place of classical. Yet as Brouwer shifted from criticizing formal
mathematics into producing an intuitionist alternative he thought more
and more of logic. He encouraged Heyting to formalize an intuitionistic
logic despite Brouwer’s well known misgivings [Stigt 1990, 285–92]. This
logic needed some more positive basis than religious and epistemological
distrust. Heyting focussed on ﬁrst order logic, where he in fact captu-
red a general sense of stability under variation. He was certainly aware
of stability under topological variation, and under computable variation
(later formalized in Kleene’s realizability), and under variation along po-
sets of “stages of knowledge” (later formalized in Kripke models). Each
one of those is in fact general enough to produce the ﬁrst order logic of
toposes in general.
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